On the eve of the 21st century, Senegal is faced with a number of worrisome social problems: high illiteracy (67% in 1995), low education level, restricted access to potable water in both urban and rural areas (52%), short life expectancy (54 years), a prevalence of water and hygiene related diseases, under-developed urban sanitation infrastructure and poor access to health care facilities (40% of the population between 1985-95). To this we must add that 30% of the households in Senegal live below the poverty line. Even worse, according to a study by the World Bank, if the current trend persists, acute poverty risks affecting up to 60% of the population by 2015. The stakes are therefore getting greater and each day time is running out…

The question we would like to address is whether economic growth, in the context of economic liberalisation, is compatible with the goal of poverty reduction.

Must we satisfy ourselves, based on the example of many countries (the United States and Great Britain, for example), with economic growth that is closely followed by an increase in the poverty level? Economic growth alone, as a means of poverty reduction, has its limitations. In this case, perhaps a new approach, one with different priorities, is needed: one where a reduction in poverty is achieved through improving access to basic services rather than one based on the sole objective of promoting growth. Focusing on basic services does not need to contradict the goals of economic growth since social investment is in itself a means of achieving growth, as long as we remain conscious of the wider effects it can have on employment, revenue, etc.

The hypothesis is based on the assumption that the notions of poverty and access to basic services are related, in the way: I am poor, therefore I do not have access to basic services Û I do not have access to basic services, therefore I am poor. We propose a new dimension to this cause and effect relationship. We are looking to understand in which ways the existing legislation and regulations governing access to basic services can either constrain or hinder access to these services and ultimately, the fight against poverty.

Among the existing basic services, water was unanimously chosen as the subject of our study by virtue of it being at the root of a number of other problems, such a health, environment, sanitation and in a more general way, quality of life. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), 80% of all illnesses in the world are associated with non-potable or poor quality water. Consequently, the cost of poor access to water entails very high social costs. Furthermore, upstream investment (in terms of health and sanitation) results in heavy costs and losses if there is insufficient investment downstream, that is in the water sector.

For example, building health clinics which are well-stocked with rehydration salts and vaccines against Hepatitis B is very fine and well, but the health problems will not be solved until we address the source of the dehydration or Hepatitis, which is poor water quality.

Indeed, water issues must be addressed as part of a complementary and inseparable whole: the trio of water, sanitation and health.

To begin, we will measure the degree of the constraints related to the legislation and regulation of the water sector. Comparisons will then be made between the different foreseeable scenarios:

Scenario 1: maintaining the status quo or a continuation of current practices, that is, the segmentation of the various sub-sectors and incoherent investment.

Scenario 2: taking measures to establish the links between water, sanitation and health in order to target strategic levels for investment.

One of our goals is to demonstrate that the cost of the first scenario is much higher than the cost of the second, since the latter aims to minimize financial, technical and human losses while concentrating on preventing problems.

Ultimately, our objective is to promote an active dialogue between all stakeholders (population, academic and private institutions, NGOs, etc.) to, on the one hand, allow them to meet - this opportunity is not as common as one would think - and on the other hand, to identify the person or group of people who will effect change. Finally, we aim to generate awareness of the situation and the consequences of inaction, and to look for solutions that will have a real effect on the problem. This requires creating a symposium that will reunite all the active and appropriate stakeholders to become a true movement for change.

2. Location and duration of study

The study  focuses on the city of Dakar. The choice of an urban location, and more precisely the country's capital, is explained by the current demographic distribution of the Senegalese population (of which 20% is found in Dakar) and the future trend of urban migration and growth.

The programme has given itself four years to achieve its goal, that is, "four years to save Dakar". Considering the enormity of the problem, it would seem overly hopeful to complete the project in less time. However, even more important, rushing the project would have serious implications for its credibility.

3. Methodology

The chosen methodology, which has already proven successful, identifies several levels for study:

- the users

- the institutions

- the legislative framework

- the cost of access to potable water (for the population as much as for the government or others)

Using this framework, statistics will be collected, legal and institutional documents will be reviewed and interviews with personnel from the principal institutions, as well as with the populations in the "vulnerable" neighborhoods of Dakar (Rebeuss, Niaye, Rail, Medina, Pikine-Guediawaya) will be conducted.

The adopted methodology is divided into three principal sections:

Describe the current situation: What is the water situation in Dakar? Who has access to water and at what cost? Who are the responsible institutions (private, management societies, community groups, etc.)? What are the legal requirements governing the water sector? Which alternative solutions have already been applied? How have these alternatives been encouraged or hindered by the legal framework?

Determine the weaknesses: Where are the bottlenecks? Why do they happen? How

are these translated to the user?

Foresee possible solutions: Are the alternative solutions already in place reproducible?

What should be done at the institutional or at other levels? What changes are needed

in the institutional or legal areas to improve the situation? If needed, which

alternatives should we favour?

Contrary to popular belief, the water and institutional sectors are rich in documented information. The Water Code, created in 1981, constitutes the first important step in the regulation and legislation of this sector. Yet disappointingly, almost all of these documents are either unknown or underused. For its part, the institutional environment is undergoing a number of changes regarding the division of tasks and the organisations responsible for carrying them out. We will begin by describing this rich institutional and normative area.

1) Water related documents

a) The Water Code

Created in 1981, the Water Code comprises 110 articles separated in six sections: schedule for water use, water quality protection, water uses and priorities for usage, restrictions for the private sector, infractions and sanctions, and finally, various items pertaining to the implementation of the Code.

The essential principal underlying the Water Code is that of water as a common (i.e., public) resource. In other words, it is a good which requires careful planning, conscientious management and equitable distribution, based on the uses and need of the various stakeholders and with respect to public interests.

However, since its creation in 1981, the Code has not been followed up by the supporting documentation necessary for its implementation. Therefore, as noted during the National Conference on 'Strategies for the Management of Water Resources' organised by the World Bank in 1996, a revision and an adaptation of the Water Code are necessary. This is especially since the socio-economic context has evolved since the Code’s inception. The institutional aspects of the Water Code are supported by other often equally obscure Codes - namely the Environment Code, the Health Code and most importantly, the Hygiene Code which devotes four sections to water hygiene. Similarly, the 1964 Law of the National Domain also governs the water sector since it serves to preserve the public right to riparian areas.

b) The World Health Organisation (WHO) Standards

The World Health Organisation has established a number of standards related to drinking water quality. These directives are not enforceable, but serve as a target for countries to achieve. However, like many under-developed countries, Senegal’s water falls below the WHO Standards, particularly in terms of nitrate concentrations. The elevated levels of nitrates and ammonium in Thiaroye’s wells, for example, can be traced to contamination by fecal matter and leaching of fertilizers, and may also be at the root of an outbreak of methomoglobinemia .

2. The Institutions

A number of institutions are responsible for the management of the water sector at both the national and sub-regional levels.

1. The SONES, SDE, ONAS ‘trio’

Following a World Bank sponsored project in 1983, the Société Nationale d’Exploitation des Eaux du Sénégal (SONEES) was created and given the monopoly over the Senegalese water sector. A little over ten years later, the second phase of the project was implemented in the form of the Water Sector Project. The goal of the Project was to reinforce institutional capacity and, as a means of achieving this, three separate and distinct entities were created: the SONES, the SDE and the ONAS.

The Société Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal [National Water Society of Senegal] (SONES) was created in 1995 and is responsible for managing the country’s water resources. As owner of the water infrastructure, the SONES provides investment and financing for water development projects, supervises new developments and the rehabilitation of old systems, and provides quality control.

Sénégalaise des Eaux [Senegalese Water] (SDE) was created in 1996 and works as a ‘private partner’ to help exploit and maintain the water distribution network, handle billing issues and provide customer service and communications. The SDE has a ten year contract with the government, whereby they are required to remit a percentage of their earnings to the government and contribute towards the maintenance and extension of the water distribution network.

The Office National de l’Assainissement [National Sanitation Office] (ONAS) is a government agency which, as its name implies, is responsible for all work related to sanitation. This branch needs to invest more heavily into modernising and enlarging the current sanitation system, as currently only 25% of Dakar’s households are connected to the sanitation system.

2. The Ministries

The Ministry of Water Resources is perhaps the principal player in the water sector, assuming the responsibility for the overall management of water in Senegal. Its mission is broad: planning, data collection, water project implementation, financing, legislation, etc. The Ministry is divided into two branches: the Direction de l’Hydraulique et de l’Assainissement [Office of Water and Sanitation] (DHA) and the Direction de l’Exploitation et de la Maintenance [Office of Operation and Maintenance] (DEM).

Other Ministries are involved indirectly in the management of water in Senegal, such as: the Ministry of Agriculture (irrigation, pollution from agrochemicals), Ministry of Public Health and Social Action (sanitation and hygiene standards), Ministry for the Environment and the Protection of Nature (ecosystem), Ministry of the Interior (local administration and decentralisation) and the Ministry of Justice (application of the various water-related legislation).

3. Sub-Regional Institutions

Two sub-regional institutions should be mentioned: the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS) and the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Gambie (OMVG). Both organisations are gaining more influence in the management of the water resources in Senegal. However, since their work does not include Dakar, we will not give a detailed description here.

4. Consultative Institutions

These include the Conseil Supérieur de l’Eau [Superior Council for Water] (CSE), the Comité Technique de l’Eau [Technical Committee on Water] (CTE) and the Conseil Supérieur de l’Environnement et des Ressources Naturelles [Superior Council for the Environment and Natural Resources] (CONSERE). It must be noted, though, that only the CONSERE currently exists. However, the previous two have been debated for so long, we can only hope that they will be instituted sometime in the near future.

2. Institutional strategies established through large projects

1. The Water Sector Project

This project has received funding from the World Bank, the French Development Bank and the German Kfw. The project is divided into three phases over a period of four years (1996 to 2000). The first phase was completed with the establishment of the three agencies SONES, SDE and ONAS. The second phase is currently running, though encountering some difficulties.

2. The Cayor Canal Improvement Project

This project, begun ten years ago, was conceived to provide Dakar with a permanent source of water originating from the Senegal River. This is made possible with the construction of an open canal leading from de Guiers Lake. The project also aims to provide irrigation water to bordering fields and to generate employment.

c. Fossil Valleys Revitalisation Project

The objective of this project is to help re-establish the normal hydrology in the country and to return water to the ancient riverbeds which have been lost since colonial times. The project aims, through the construction of canals and dikes, to return water to six valleys by the year 2000. The budget for the project, over $60 million, is relatively modest compared to the size of the endeavour.

3. The Water Situation in Dakar

1. Water Production

The Sénégalaise des Eaux (SDE), which is mandated to make the most efficient use of the hydraulic infrastructure, exploits two main water sources:

• Surface water: principally from Lake de Guiers, and less importantly, from the Senegal and Gambie Rivers.
• Groundwater aquifers.

In general, urban centres are fed from one single source, with the exception of Dakar, which receives up to 20% of its water from surface sources (Lake de Guiers) and 80% from groundwater aquifers located between Lake de Guiers and Pointe des Almadies.

However, the daily water production by SONES consistently falls below the daily requirements of the city by almost one third, and demand is growing by an average 6% per year.

According to SDE personnel, the deficit between water demand and water supply is due to a number of reasons, namely:

• enormous losses (up to 63,000 m³/year) and weakness in the delivery system;
• limited capacity of the aquifers;
• salinisation/seawater intrusion of several aquifers rendering them unusable;
• exponential growth of the population in Dakar;
• overexploitation of the aquifers which feed the main surface water sources;
• high demand along the canal leading from Lake de Guiers.

In response to the chronic water deficit in Dakar, the SDE has attempted to improve the distribution among the various neighbourhoods in the city by alternating service in the different areas and providing water in the evenings to residential neighbourhoods where many have water tanks and reservoirs. However, this "redistribution" has not favoured many areas in Dakar, where the situation remains critical (i.e., water provided at 3 or 5 in the morning, shortages lasting 2 to 3 days, etc.).

1. Water Quality

Water quality is tested according to the WHO standards for both chemical and biological contaminants. In general, surface water requires more stringent treatment than water originating from groundwater sources. The contract between the SONES and the SDE requires the SDE to conduct daily quality tests on both the untreated and treated water in Dakar and in the other regional capitals. For rural and smaller urban areas, water quality is tested on a weekly basis.

Box 1: Water Quality

What happens to the water quality after it has left the laboratory? The threat of re-contamination as treated water passes through deteriorating pipes is often neglected. This is of particular importance in a system that often sees water stagnating for several hours or even days before sufficient pressure returns to the system. It is not uncommon for the water exiting from household taps to have a yellowish or even reddish-brown colour.

Water from wells and boreholes, which has quickly become the preferred alternative for many on the outskirts of Dakar due to the prohibitive cost of purchasing treated drinking water, is of dubious quality and is potentially dangerous to the health of the population

2. Costs of Water Access

1. Cost of connection to drinking water supply

Before the institutional restructuring of the water sector, metered household connections to the potable water supply were financed by the Senegalese government, with only a token charge paid by the beneficiaries. Since the creation of the SDE in 1996, the federal government has devolved responsibility for this task to the SONES, whose programmes are elaborated each year based on funding.

Rates and charges have still not been officially set. Nevertheless, the cost of connecting to the system has increased considerably. Low-income clients are placed on SDE waiting lists to receive special subsidies, but up until now, little progress has been made to identify the beneficiaries of community connections. The World Bank is intending to finance 36,000 new connections, but this will not be sufficient to resolve the problems faced by the majority of the poor or vulnerable population.

Due to the prohibitive cost of connecting to the water supply, the demand for new connections is relatively weak in Dakar, at only about 1000 per year. Indeed, the bulk of the demand is from new cities and neighbourhoods. Between 1992 and 1994, several community connections were established in the neighbourhoods of Médina, Grand Dakar, Hann Montagne and Hann Pêcheurs. This project has significantly increased the number of households served by the drinking water supply system.

2. The cost of water

According to the World Bank, the cost of water in Senegal is within the means of the middle class. The World Bank further estimates that households would be willing to pay more for water, assuming they received a regular and safe supply. They support this opinion by stating that households obtaining water from private providers pay three times more per cubic meter than those supplied through the public connections.

One of the conditions imposed by the World Bank on the Senegalese government in terms of its water sector projects is the increase in tariffs by 3% over the period of 1997-2003. This is needed to reflect the evolution in production costs, inflation and changes in the value of the currency over time.

1. Potable Water Consumption

Between 1975 and 1980, 36% of the Senegalese population had access to potable water. From 1990 to 1995, this number increased to 52%, with 28% in rural areas and 85% in urban areas. According to the Ministry of Finance and Planning, in 1995, 63.2% of the households in Senegal have access to potable water, with 90% of these in urban areas and only 43% in rural areas.

If access to the potable water supply has increased over the past fifteen years, daily consumption per person has seen a net decrease. From 63 litres per person per day in urban areas in 1980, the number has fallen to 54 litres in 1994. This decrease is even more noticeable for the city of Dakar (from 88 litres pppd to 69 litres pppd). It is evident that this change is related to the high cost of water and the difficulties associated with obtaining it.

In urban areas, 36.6% of households obtain their water from private suppliers, 35.8% from pumped groundwater, 13% from communal taps and 12.6% from wells. Average domestic consumption varies greatly from one neighbourhood to another. For example, high-income households consume on average five times more than middle-class homes and up to nineteen times more than someone living in one of the poor neighbourhoods.

Communal taps provide the most important means of access to water for low-income and poor neighbourhoods. Establishing public taps in all the neighbourhoods and suburbs of Dakar was part of the government policy before 1991. The policy aimed to provide the most deprived communities with free access to water, with the costs carried by each municipality. However, providing water free of charge to poor communities proved to be counter-productive. In most neighbourhoods, wastage was particularly high, leaving the municipalities to pay large water bills that many were not able to sustain. The SONES was therefore placed in a position of great financial difficulty. To solve this problem, the government stopped providing water for free and is proceeding with privatising the water taps.

The end result of charging for communal tap water has been an overall reduction in water consumption, with a consequent reduction in the municipal water expenditure. Furthermore, privatisation of the water taps has led to the creation of over 1000 new jobs, improved hygiene conditions around the taps and fewer conflicts regarding the wastage of water at the source. However, the commercialisation of the water taps has not helped to resolve the problem of accessibility to water sources, and the cost of water remains prohibitively high in many poor neighbourhoods.

The high cost of communal tap water, in addition to the illicit activities of some, is not the only factor involved in the difficulty of commercialising water. We can also note:

• competition from persons selling water from their home taps often at a higher cost;
• the unreliability of the instruments used to measure water flow/volume;
• fraud on the part of the tap owners;
• difficult working conditions;
• long queues;
• absence of a control system for the management of communal taps.

The privatisation of the communal taps was originally intended to generate a sense of responsibility among the population and encourage water conservation until communal connections could be established in all the urban centres in the country. However, relatively few connections have actually been made. To conclude this discussion on communal taps, let us look at the case of Baraque: